What to read after Correcting the Course: How the Biden Administration Should Compete for Influence in the Indo-Pacific?

Key judgements

1. The Biden administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has so far lacked focus and urgency. Despite its deep regional expertise and the region’s high expectations, it has failed to articulate a comprehensive regional strategy or treat the Indo-Pacific as its decisive priority. 

2. The Biden administration’s focus on bringing normalcy back to US regional policy has restored the status quo, but not advanced its standing in the Indo-Pacific. 

3. The Biden administration’s approach to competition with China has focused on the domestic and global arenas, rather than on competing for influence within the Indo-Pacific. 

4. The Biden administration’s focus on long-term systems competition with China overlooks the urgency of near-term competition in the Indo-Pacific.

5. The Biden administration has placed strategic competition with China at the top of its foreign and security policy agenda. It has sought to balance US-China rivalry with opportunities for cooperation and efforts to stabilise the regional order.

6. The Biden administration views its Indo-Pacific allies as regional and international “force multipliers.” It has largely trained these alliances on global order issues, with few new initiatives at the regional level and insufficient focus on empowering allies to meet their own security needs.

7. The Biden administration sees the United States as being in a “systems competition” between democracy and autocracy. By making ideological competition with China an organising principle for US foreign policy, Washington risks undermining its attractiveness as a partner for politically diverse Indo-Pacific countries. 

8. The Biden administration cannot compete against China effectively in the Indo-Pacific without prioritising engagement with Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. It has recognised the need to do more in Southeast Asia, but its success may be limited by its approach to competition with China and lack of an economic strategy.

9. The Biden administration, like its predecessors, lacks an economic strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. This major weakness in regional policy is driven by US protectionist trade preferences at home. Proposed initiatives on digital trade and infrastructure cannot compensate for the absence of a comprehensive trade-based economic approach. 

10. The Biden administration views China as a predominantly long-term military challenge. Its efforts to minimise spending on US forward posture in the region suggest it may be less committed to a strategy of deterrence by denial to prevent Chinese aggression. 

Recommendations for the Biden administration

To compete for influence in the Indo-Pacific, the Biden administration should: 

1. Clearly identify the Indo-Pacific region as its foreign and defence policy priority and marshal resources accordingly.

2. Articulate clear goals for its relationship with China and its strategic position in the Indo-Pacific region.

3. Avoid emphasising ideological competition with China and instead focus on maximising its influence by responding to regional needs. 

4. Signal its commitment to a strategy of deterrence by denial to prevent Chinese aggression and bolster its investments in Western Pacific military posture to reinforce its credibility. 

5. Empower its allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defence requirements by reducing legislative and political obstacles to allied self-strengthening. 

6. Pay special attention to Southeast Asia as a region of strategic importance, given its geography, size and the fluidity of its alignment dynamics.

7. Clearly signal that it is committed to mutually beneficial economic engagement with the Indo-Pacific and adopt trade and investment strategies that reinforce its role as an indispensable resident economic power.